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Abstract
The paper clarifies how sunk costs can lead a rational incumbent to innovate less than an entrant. It 
also demonstrates that competition among incumbents yields less adoption of new and more efficient 
production technology than competition which includes entrants. The results suggest that policy 
promoting adoption of next-generation production technology should distinguish among firms based on 
their sunk costs in current-generation technology and encourage entry by industry outsiders such as 
startups or firms from other industries.
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1. Introduction
Consider a policy that aims to accelerate development of next-generation technology in a given 
industry. Using a variety of instruments such as grants, subsidies, tax benefits, and patents, the policy 
encourages firms to invest in research and development ?R&D?. The question arises, which firms should 
the policy target? Does it matter for innovation performance whether the R&D competition includes only 
industry incumbents or whether it also includes newcomers such as newly formed ventures or entrants 
diversifying from other industries? Answering these questions is important because, innovation 
performance being equal, it would be preferable for the policy to focus on incumbents rather than take 
on the more expansive and risky task of promoting entry. One reason for this is ease of implementation: 
because the set of incumbents is typically a known, finite set of firms, it is much easier to deal with just 
the incumbents as compared to qualifying and interacting with an indefinite number of potential entrants. 
Another reason is that industry entry often goes hand-in-hand with industry exit, and such turnover of 
firms typically dislocates workers and entails costly redeployment or duplication of assets.
A prominent example of policy that relied on competition among incumbents is Japan?s post-war 
industrial policy, which generated impressive R&D performance in semiconductors and other industries 
by working long-term with a stable but highly competitive set of incumbents. ?Okimoto, 1989? At the 
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opposite extreme is the venture-capital / Silicon Valley system of innovation, which enshrines the startup 
venture as an indispensable catalyst of innovation and thrives on displacing incumbents. A less extreme 
case is entry not by newly organized firms but by established firms from other industries. In Japan, for 
instance, interindustry competition has catalyzed development of optical fiber and interindustry 
collaboration has led to technology fusion underlying the successful development of the mechatronics 
and optoelectronics industries. ?Kodama, 1995? These examples suggest that although lacking entrants 
may not preclude innovation, having entrants may help. Although far from being conclusive, this 
observation casts some doubt on the sufficiency of an incumbent-centric innovation policy.
Further evidence that incumbents may innovate less well than entrants is found in management 
scholarship on the interplay of technology and organization. That scholarship characterizes some 
technological discontinuities as ?competence-destroying? or ?disruptive? and argues that incumbents 
have organizational difficulties espousing such technologies. ?Anderson and Tushman, 1997; Henderson 
and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997? In this vein, Foster?s ?1986? and Christensen?s ?1997? book-length 
accounts of the ?attacker?s advantage? and ?innovator?s dilemma,? respectively, detail many instances of 
incumbents over-allocating resources to incrementally improve their existing businesses at the neglect of 
paradigm-shifting innovation needed to survive technological discontinuities. In other words, 
incumbents? investment behavior seems to be constrained by sunk costs in and on-going benefits from 
current-generation technology, in contrast to entrants who appear free to pursue next-generation 
technology without such constraints. The management literature interprets this as a mistake and searches 
for organizational solutions to give incumbents the same flexibility as enjoyed by entrants. The upshot 
for innovation policy is that unless policymakers trust that incumbents can overcome their organizational 
impediments, it?s best to take a pro-entry stance.
This paper goes further to provide a firmer basis for pro-entry innovation policy. The paper shows that 
sunk costs in current-generation technology is a sufficient condition for an incumbent to rationally 
pursue next generation technology to a lesser extent than an entrant. Sunk costs are at the heart of what 
distinguishes incumbents from entrants. However sunk costs are not supposed to affect rational 
decisionmakers seeking to maximize future profits. After all, every business school graduate must have 
heard about the sunk-cost fallacy. This paper resolves this apparent paradox by providing a theoretical 
basis for how sunk costs make incumbents rationally innovate less the entrants. It then applies the theory 
to qualify the differences in innovation performance generated by incumbent-only competition vis-a-vis 
competition which includes entrants. 
The theory leads to an unusual view of the incumbent: rather than being unfavorably constrained by 
its past, the incumbent possesses a comparative advantage over entrants in the form of an option to 
operate the old way on terms more favorable than those available to newcomers. Moreover, the theory 
shows that there are conditions under which the incumbent rationally chooses to exercise this ?status 
quo? option whereas the entrant rationally chooses to innovate. Furthermore, the theory demonstrates 
that entrants spur innovation in the sense that competition between incumbents alone is less prone to 
generate innovation than competition that includes an entrant. Thus, an industry that regularly pits 
incumbents against entrants is likely to generate more innovation than a similarly concentrated industry 
comprised of a stable set of competing firms. Echoing Schumpeter?s ?1950, p. 84? famous assertion that 
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the relevant problem is not ?how capitalism administers existing structures ? ?but? how it creates and 
destroys them,? these findings provide a theoretical basis for why innovation policy should promote 
entry rather than rely on competition among incumbents. 
2. Framework for analysis
Our unit of analysis will be a firm that develops a production technology and then uses it to 
manufacture goods for sale. The firm makes a one-time upfront investment to carry out R&D and build 
the production facilities. After the development phase, the firm manufactures the goods, sells them in an 
output market, and earns a certain per-period profit. The profit depends on production costs, demand, and 
competition. 
Our analytical framework has two periods and two firms: an incumbent which operates in periods 1 
and 2 and an entrant, such as a newly organized firm or an existing firm from another industry, which 
operates only in period 2. The only difference between the incumbent and the entrant is that the former 
has sunk an investment into an ?old technology? in period 1 whereas the latter has not. The decision of 
interest is the period 2 technology choice by the incumbent and the entrant, each of which can adopt a 
new technology that has emerged after period 1 as an alternative to the old technology. Specifically, the 
decision for the entrant is whether build its factory with the new or the old technology; the decision 
facing the incumbent is whether to continue producing with the old factory in period 2 or build a new 
one.
This framework parsimoniously captures several essential features of technology choice by 
incumbents and entrants and will allow us to derive insights about the differences in innovation behavior 
of firms and innovation performance of industries. We will proceed by considering the set of all possible 
new technologies ?hereinafter referred to as ?innovation projects?? and examining the relationships 
among the following four collectively exhaustive subsets:
1. Innovation projects that only an entrant undertakes
2. Innovation projects that only an incumbent undertakes
3. Innovation projects that both undertake
4. Innovation projects that neither undertakes
By comparing these subsets, we will be able to characterize the relative propensity to innovate by 
incumbents and entrants, and contrast the innovation performance of various competition regimes.
We will make the assumption that each firm can operate only one technology in period 2, either new 
or old. This assumption permits focus on the tradeoff between innovation and the status quo, but biases 
results towards portraying a starker difference than what is likely to be observed in settings where 
straddling the old and the new is possible. Although this ?no-straddling? assumption oversimplifies 
reality, arguably, it is representative of a significant fraction of actual circumstances since firms often 
face financial and self-consistency constraints that preclude them from simultaneously pursuing the old 
and the new.1?
1? In the context of business innovation, Porter ?1996? and ?Christensen, 1997, pp. 112-5? discuss the need to have a 
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3. Are entrants more likely to innovate than incumbents?
Before we can characterize the effect of entry on industry innovation performance, we need to first 
characterize differences in innovation behavior of incumbents and entrants. It is helpful to begin analysis 
with the case of no competition and then add competition.
3.1 No competition
There are two identical monopolists, each facing an output market for its product. The markets are 
identical but completely isolated from each other by some trade barrier such as geography or regulation. 
In period 1, one of the monopolists invests K > 0 to develop the only available technology at that time; 
the other monopolist is not active in period 1. The technology allows production characterized by cost 
parameter k > 0. 2? The first monopolist undertakes production with the technology, sells the output, and 
earns ?k  in profit ?gross of the investment K?. In period 2, the first monopolist can persevere, using the 
technology it has already developed to again earn ?k without any additional investment.3? Alternatively, 
in period 2 it can invest R > 0 to develop a new technology, which allows more efficient production at 
unit cost r < k. If the monopolist produces with the new technology and sells the output, it will earn ?r 
in profit in period 2 ?gross of the investment R?. Both technologies produce identical goods but the new 
technology is more efficient, which under standard assumptions implies that ?r > ?k.
4?
The second monopolist enters in period 2 by either imitating the first monopolist?s first period 
technology or investing in the new technology. Like the first monopolist, it can invest either K or R to 
develop the old or new technology, respectively, and will earn either ?k or ?r in profit upon selling the 
products in its own output market.5? Figure 1 shows the decision trees for the two monopolists. We will 
refer to period 2 outcomes in terms of who innovates using the following notation ?see Table 1?: 
??EO? Entrant Only: entrant chooses new technology, incumbent stays with old
??IO? Incumbent Only: incumbent chooses new technology, entrant chooses old
??BT? Both: entrant and incumbent choose new technology
??NT? Neither: entrant chooses old technology and incumbent stays with old technology
coherent strategy as a reason why firms are sometimes unable to operate new and old business models in parallel and 
are forced to choose only one.
2? As is common in the economics literature on innovation ?see Tirole, 1988?, I conceive technology as process 
technology and characterize it in terms of a cost parameter which represents the unit cost of production enabled by 
the technology.
3? To simplify analysis, I do not explictly discount period 2 cash flows relative to period 1. Adding such discounting to 
the model does not lead to any substantive changes. Period 2 profit can be interpreted as the discounted present value 
of a long stream of profits.
4? In addition to the case of r<k treated here, another conceivable case, not pursued here, is the case of r>k and R<K. 
This corresponds to a new technology that is less efficient to produce with but cheaper to develop or setup. In such a 
case, the incumbent would not invest in the new technology under any circumstances but the entrant might. However, 
if we view period 2 profits as the present value of a long-term profit stream that follows development, it is difference 
in per-unit costs rather than upfront investment that is likely to drive the technology choice decision.
5? To guarantee that entry occurs, I assume that investment in technology K can be recouped in one period: Pk > K.
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At the start of period 2, the incumbent ?first monopolist? has vested interest in old technology and the 
entrant ?second monopolist? does not. From the decision trees in Figure 1, it follows that the entrant 
innovates if and only if
???????????????r? R > ?k? K ?1?
whereas the incumbent innovates if and only if
???????????????r? R > ?k. ?2?
Being a forward-looking profit-maximizer, the incumbent avoids the sunk-cost fallacy by ignoring its 
sunk cost K. However, K indirectly makes the incumbent relatively more conservative by affecting the 
entrant?s decision. The entrant compares the gain from innovation to the gain from imitation, net of 
technology investment, whereas the incumbent compares the gain from innovation, net of investment in 
new technology, to the pure gain from persevering ?without subtracting from that gain the sunk 
investment in old technology?. This fundamental difference in the calculus employed by the incumbent 
and the entrant implies that there are innovation projects that an entrant would pursue but an incumbent 
Figure 1. Decision trees for the incumbent and the entrant. Payoffs shown are for the second period only.
–K 
–R 
Πk
Πr – R  
–R 
Πk – K 
Πr – R  
–K 
Period 1 Period 2 
Entrant 
Incumbent 
Innovate (new tech) 
Innovate (new tech) 
Persevere (old tech) 
Imitate (old tech) 
Invest in old tech 
0 
Table 1. Notation for designating period 2 outcomes
Entrant’s technology choice
Old New
Incumbent’s 
technology
choice
Old NT EO
New IO BT
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would not, and not vice versa. 
More formally, for a given old technology ?k, K?, the set of innovation projects that an entrant alone 
undertakes without competition with the incumbent is:
???????EO?k, K? = {?r, R? : ?r??k < R < ?r??k? K} ?3?
The other three sets of interest are:
???????IO = ? ?4?
???????BT?k? = {?r, R? : R < ?r??k} ?5?
???????NT?k, K? = {?r, R? : R > ?r??k? K} ?6?
Result 1 and the Venn diagram in Figure 2 summarize these results.
Result 1.?In the absence of competition, an incumbent is more conservative than an entrant in the sense 
that there exist innovation projects which only an entrant pursues but there do not exist innovation 
projects which only an incumbent pursues.
3.2 Duopoly
Let us now add competition to the model. Instead of two monopolists selling in isolated output 
markets, let the firms be duopolists competing in a single output market in period 2. As before, each firm 
must decide which technology to use in period 2: an old technology parameterized by ?k, K? or a new 
technology parameterized by ?r, R?, where K>0, R>0 are upfront investments and k > r > 0 are cost 
parameters sufficient to determine equilibrium profits under a given specification of demand and 
competition. Denote equilibrium duopoly profits by ?k?r?, ?r?k?, ?r?r?, and ?k?k?, where ?x?y? 
represents the highest profit a firm can earn in period 2 if it uses technology with cost x, provided the 
other firm is maximizing its own profits using technology with cost y. Without restricting the model to a 
particular specification of production, competition or demand, let us only assume that the profit functions 
are differentiable and that a duopolist earns higher profits the lower its own costs and the higher its rival?s 
costs, ceteris paribus:
Figure 2.  Venn diagram of innovation projects pursued by incumbents and/or entrants in the absence of 
competition.
ENTRANT ONLY INNOVATES 
BOTH 
INNOVATE 
ALL INNOVATION PROJECTS 
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x y∂?
∂x ∂y
? ? x y∂?? ?< 0 and > 0. ?7?
These conditions hold in many standard models of competition such as Cournot and under reasonable 
assumptions on demand. The conditions imply:
??????????????k?r? < ?k?k? < ?r?r? < ?r?k?. ?8?
To guarantee that entry occurs, let us assume that ?k?r? > K, which means that the entrant can enter 
with old technology and turn a profit regardless of which technology the incumbent chooses.6? All 
payoffs and the structure of the game are common knowledge. The firms make their period 2 technology 
choice decision simultaneously. The period 2 payoff matrix is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Entrant-incumbent competition （Generation Gap） game
Entrant
Old New
Incumbent Old Πk（k）; Πk（k）− K Πk（r）; Πr（k）− R
New Πr（k）− R; Πk（r）− K Πr（r）− R; Πr（r）− R
Proceeding as before, we fix the old technology and consider the set of all innovation projects {?r, R? : 
0<r<k and R>0}. Using the payoff matrix in Table 2, we can solve for conditions under which each of 
the four possible outcomes is a Nash equilibrium and then identify subsets of innovation projects 
corresponding to each equilibrium. Doing so yields the following. For a given old technology ?k, K?, 
the set of innovation projects that are pursued solely by the entrant in equilibrium is:
????EONE?k, K? = {?r, R? : ?r?r???k?r? < R < ?r?k???k?k?? K} ?9?
The sets of innovation projects corresponding to the other three possible equilibria are:
????IONE?k, K? = {?r, R? : ?r?r???k?r?? K< R < ?r?k???k?k?} ?10?
????BTNE?k? = {?r, R? : R < ?r?r???k?r?} ?11?
????NTNE?k, K? = {?r, R? : R > ?r?k???k?k?? K} ?12?
From ?9? and ?10? it follows that IONE ? EONE. Thus, as was the case without competition, there are 
innovation projects that an entrant would pursue in equilibrium but an incumbent would not. Unlike the 
case without competition, however, a proper subset of such projects can also be part of another Nash 
equilibrium in which the incumbent innovates and the entrant does not. Although both the EO and IO 
equilibria result in the same technology adoption pattern, namely that one firm uses the old technology 
and one firm uses the new, the IO equilibrium is clearly less efficient because it requires K more in 
upfront investment.7?
Furthermore, comparing ?3?, ?5?, and ?6? yields: NTNE ? BTNE = ?, NTNE ? EONE = ?, and 
6? Assuming profitable entry allows the analysis to focus on the differences in innovation strategies by incumbents and 
entrants, setting aside the complementary question of whether entry occurs. The latter question is addressed in a 
separate literature on entry and entry barriers ?see Gilbert, 1989?
7? Nevertheless, the IO equilibrium cannot be easily ruled out through game-theoretic analysis.
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BTNE ? EONE = ?. Result 2 and the Venn diagram in Figure 3 summarize these results.
Result 2.?An incumbent competing against an entrant is relatively more conservative in the sense that 
?a? there exist innovation projects which are pursued by the entrant in some Nash equilibrium of the 
competition game but are not pursued by the incumbent in any Nash equilibrium; and 
?b? there do not exist innovation projects which are pursued by an incumbent in some Nash 
equilibrium but are not pursued by the entrant in any Nash equilibrium.
3.3 The case of Cournot duopoly with linear demand
Examining the above general findings in the context of a benchmark model of competition provides 
additional insights. Consider a Cournot duopoly facing linear inverse demand p = a? bq, where a and b 
are positive constants, q is quantity and p is price of the output good. With this demand specification, 
equilibrium profits ?gross of investment? to a Cournot duopolist with cost x facing a rival with cost y is 
given by?x?y? = ?a?2x?y?2 /9b; if both firms have the same costs, this reduces to 
?x?x? = ?a?x?2 /9b. Substituting these profit functions into ?9???12? yields the sets of innovation 
projects corre sponding to each of the four possible equilibria:
????EONE?k, K? = {?r, R?: 
4
9b?a? k?k? r? < R < 
4
9b?a? r?k? r?? K} ?13?
????IONE?k, K? = {?r, R?:  
4
9b?a? k?k? r?? K <  R < 
4
9b?a? r?k? r?} ?14?
????BTNE?k? = {?r, R?: R < 
4
9b?a? k?k? r?} ?15?
????NTNE?k, K? = {?r, R?: R > 
4
9b?a? r?k? r?? K} ?16?
Inspecting ?13? and ?14? reveals that EONE is contiguous to BTNE with the boundary given by 
Figure 3.  Venn diagram of innovation projects pursued in equilibrium by incumbents and/or entrants under 
competition.
ENTRANT ONLY INNOVATES 
INCUMBENT ONLY 
INNOVATES 
BOTH 
INNOVATE 
ALL INNOVATION PROJECTS 
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R =
4
9?1?k?k?r?. Similarly, EO
NE is contiguous to NTNE with the boundary given by 
R = 
4
9?1?r?k?r?? K. IO
NE is contained within EONE with boundaries given by ?14?. Figure 4 plots 
the four regions. This is the concrete version of the abstract Venn diagram in Figure 3. 
Figure 4.  Innovation projects pursued in equilibrium by incumbents and/or entrants under Cournot 
competition with linear demand. Parameter values are a=100, b=.01, k = 50, K=5000.
?
??????
??????
??????
??????
???????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?
?
EO 
BT 
NT
(IO) 
EO
We can quantify the relative amounts of innovation by incumbents and entrants by considering the 
ratio of innovations by entrant alone to all innovations undertaken in equilibrium.8? We can compute this 
ratio from the sizes of the equilibrium sets as follows: |EO| / ?|EO| + |BT|?, where |S| represents the size 
of a set S. In the case of the sets in ?13???16?, this corresponds to
　　　　　　　　　　　?=
EO
EO + BT
=
4
9b
k r? ?? + K
4
9b
a r? ?k r?+ K
 ?17?
Figure 5 plots ?17? using the same parameter values as used in Figure 4. The percentage of innovations 
adopted by the entrant alone is large for minor improvements in production cost ?i. e., small values of k
? r?, but goes down as the relative efficiency of the new technology increases. However, even when the 
new technology is twice as efficient ?k = 2r?, as much as 37% of innovation projects are adopted by the 
8? This accounting implicitly assumes that innovation projects for any given level of unit cost r are uniformly distributed 
in terms of the upfront investment R.
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entrant alone.
4. Comparing incumbent-only competition to competition with entrants
The previous section demonstrated that the entrant can undertake or stimulate a significant amount of 
innovation in a duopoly that pits an incumbent against an entrant. However, what happens to innovation 
performance if instead of being an entrant, the other duopolist is also an incumbent? This section extends 
the above framework to answer this question and thereby sheds light on whether there is likely to be 
more innovation when entrants compete with incumbents as compared to incumbents competing among 
themselves. 
We proceed by comparing equilibria in the following three duopoly games, keeping all other aspects 
of the model the same:
??Generation Gap: an incumbent competes with an entrant
??Old Boys’ Club: two incumbents compete
??New Frontier: two entrants compete 
Generation Gap is the incumbent-entrant game that was analyzed in the preceding sections. The other 
two games have the same structure, but different players. The period 2 payoff matrices of the three 
games are shown in Table 3. 
To compare innovation outcomes in the three games, it is easiest to focus on the outcome NT, the 
status quo in which both firms choose the old technology K. The conditions under which NT is a Nash 
equilibrium in the three games follow from the payoff matrices. The sets of innovation projects 
corresponding to those equilibria are:
Figure 5. Percent of innovation projects adopted only by entrants out of all innovation projects that can be 
potentially adopted in Cournot equilibrium with linear demand. This is a plot of equation （17） 
with parameter values a=100, b=.01, k = 50, K=5000.　The graph shows, for example, that 
when the new technology offers a unit cost of r = 20 as opposed to the cost k = 50 offered by 
the old technology, 40% of the projects that could be undertaken by some firm are undertaken by 
entrant alone. It is assumed that innovation projects are distributed uniformly in terms of initial 
investment R.
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Generation Gap or New Frontier: 
??????NT GG?k, K? = NT NF?k, K? = {?r, R? : R > ?r?k???k?k?? K} ?18?
Old Boys’ Club:  
??????NT OBC?k? = {?r, R? : R > ?r?k???k?k?} ?19?
By inspection, NTGG = NTNF? NTOBC. This means there is less innovation in Old Boys’ Club. 
Intuitively, the sunk cost K is irrelevant to period 2 payoffs in Old Boys’ Club since both firms have 
already sunk it. Their technology choice is based on comparing producing with the new technology net 
of additional investment to producing with the old technology with no additional investment. In contrast, 
when one or both firms is an entrant, old and new technology investments enter the decision process, and 
the decision to invest in the new technology is taken on more occasions the greater the investment K 
sunk by the incumbent. This leads to the following result.
Result 3.?Entrants spur innovation in the sense that 
?a? there exist innovation projects that are not undertaken in equilibrium of an incumbents-only game 
but are undertaken in equilibrium of a game that includes an entrant, and
?b? there do not exist innovation projects that are undertaken in equilibrium of an incumbents-only 
Table 3.　Payoff matrices for three competition games
（a） Generation Gap
Entrant
Old New
Incumbent Old Πk（k）; Πk（k）− K Πk（r）; Πr（k）− R
New Πr（k）− R; Πk（r）− K Πr（r）− R; Πr（r）− R
（b） Old Boys’ Club
Incumbent 1
Old New
Incumbent 2 Old Πk（k）; Πk（k） Πk（r）; Πr（k）− R
New Πr（k）− R; Πk（r） Πr（r）− R; Πr（r）− R
（c） New Frontier
Entrant 1
Old New
Entrant 2 Old Πk（k）− K; Πk（k）− K Πk（r）− K; Πr（k）− R
New Πr（k）− R;  Πk（r）− K Πr（r）− R; Πr（r）− R
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game but are not undertaken in equilibrium of a game that includes an entrant 
In the case of the Cournot duopoly example examined in Section 3.3, the above sets become:
??????NT GG?k, K? = NT NF?k, K? = {?r, R? : R > 
4
9b?a? r?k? r?? K} ?20?
??????NT OBC?k? = {?r, R? : R > 
4
9b?a? r?k? r?} ?21?
The difference is the sunk cost K. Holding old technology ?k, K? constant and letting new technology 
parameters ?r, R? vary, Figure 6 plots innovation projects that go ignored in equilibrium of the three 
games and identifies the set of innovations that would not be adopted unless competition includes 
entrants. 
Figure 6.  Innovation projects ignored in equilibrium under Cournot competition with linear demand. The area 
between the two curves represents the additional innovation due to having entrants in the industry. 
Parameter values are a=100, b=.01, k = 50, K=5000.
?
??????
??????
??????
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?
? OLD BOYS CLUB
GENERATION GAP & NEW FRONTIER 
The increase in innovation projects adopted if we replace one of the incumbents in the duopoly with 
an entrant is given by 
?????=
NTGG NTOBC
NTOBC
=
K
4
9b
a r? ?k r?
 ?22?
Figure 7 plots ?22? using the same parameters as in Figures 4-6.?It shows the substantial increase in 
innovation adoption that can accompany a shift from incumbents-only competition to a competition 
regime that includes entrants.
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6. Conclusion
This paper developed a theoretical basis for why innovation policies that rely on competition by 
industry incumbents may underperform policies that promote entry by newly formed firms or by firms 
from other industries. The theory clarifies how an incumbent?s sunk cost in current-generation 
technology causes the incumbent to be relatively reluctant to adopt next-generation technology, as 
compared to an entrant. 
Several implications for policy can be tentatively noted. The findings suggest that innovation policy 
should explicitly distinguish incumbents from entrants using sunk costs as the litmus test of incumbency. 
To give a concrete example, consider the problem of selecting recipients of R&D assistance to develop 
next-generation production technology in a given industry. Based on the findings, which are subject to 
the limitations of the model, the following advice can be given:
?? Don?t just fund the incumbents. Also seek out and fund outsiders such as new startups, universities, 
or firms in other industries. Seek to achieve balance between experienced insiders and aggressive 
outsiders.?
?? When qualifying candidates, ascertain whether and to what degree each candidate has sunk costs in 
current-generation technologies. Make sure that at least some of the chosen candidates have no or 
minimal sunk costs.
Finally, it is notable that an incumbent being upstaged by a newcomer is not a phenomenon limited to 
modern high-technology industries. Rather, it appears to extend back in time and across many fields of 
human endeavor including political, religious, military, artistic, and scientific revolutions. Of particular 
Figure 7. Percent increase in innovation projects adopted in Cournot equilibrium with linear demand when 
competition regime changes from incumbents-only to incumbent-entrant or entrant-entrant. This 
is a plot of equation （22） with parameter values a=100, b=.01, k = 50, K=5000.　The graph 
shows, for example, that when the new technology offers a unit cost of r = 40 as opposed to the 
cost k = 50 offered by the old technology, there are about 20% more innovation projects that 
would be undertaken if entrants are involved than if there are only incumbents. It is assumed that 
innovation projects are distributed uniformly in terms of initial investment R.
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relevance here is Kuhn?s seminal work on paradigm shifts in science, in which he directly implicates 
sunk costs in the innovation performance of scientists: ?Almost always the men who achieve these 
fundamental inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field whose 
paradigm they change. And perhaps that point need not have been made explicit, for obviously these are 
men who, being little committed by prior practice to the traditional rules ... are particularly likely to ... 
conceive another set that can replace them.? Kuhn 1970, p. 90? Although the mechanisms driving 
innovation by individuals differ from those driving innovation by firms, the parallels between Kuhn?s 
observation and the findings of this paper allow us to conjecture that differences in sunk costs may be 
applicable for explaining differences in innovation performances in contexts beyond interfirm 
competition. 
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